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Implementing Socially Sustainable Practices in Challenging 
Institutional Contexts:  
Building Theory from Seven Developing Country Supplier Cases  
 
Abstract  
The implementation of socially sustainable practices in suppliers situated in challenging institutional 
contexts is examined using institutional theory, both in terms of how institutional pressures affect 
implementation and what explains the decoupling of practices from the day-to-day reality. A multi-case 
study approach is employed based on seven apparel industry suppliers in Bangladesh. Cross-case analysis 
highlights the coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures on suppliers to implement socially sustainable 
practices. A key pressure identified that has not previously been highlighted in the literature is horizontal 
collaboration between buyers, which intensifies coercive pressure on suppliers and increases the 
consequences of non-compliance. The factors that contribute to decoupling are categorized into firm, 
supply chain, and environment related factors. Further, six propositions are developed on how specific 
forms of institutional pressure can tackle particular decoupling factors to support implementation. The 
paper responds to recent calls for greater scrutiny of why and how firms decouple ethical practices and 
supports the development of the literature specifically on social sustainability, which lags behind that on 
environmental sustainability and has been largely focused on the Western buyer perspective. The findings 
have implications for the diffusion of ethical practices into supply chains, especially distant suppliers in 
very different and challenging institutional contexts. 
 




On the 24th of April 2013, the Rana Plaza, housing five Bangladeshi apparel factories producing 
garments for Western brands including Primark and Benetton, collapsed killing 1,129 people 
(BBC, 2013; Guardian, 2013; Huffington Post, 2013). This disaster was the deadliest in the 
apparel industry’s history and the deadliest in any industry for over 30 years. Poor working 
conditions and safety standards are said to have contributed to the large number of fatalities in 
this disaster (Economist, 2013; Time, 2013). As a consequence, there has been significant global 
attention on ethical standards in the Bangladeshi apparel sector and on Western buyers sourcing 
from these factories. There is an increased expectation that buyers should follow appropriate 
ethical sourcing practices and ensure that their supply chain partners do the same. 
 Ethical sourcing refers to the consideration of both green and social issues when making 
sourcing decisions (Zorzini et al., 2015). We argue that there needs to be more focus on the 
social aspect of ethical sourcing, especially while sourcing from suppliers in challenging 
developing country contexts thousands of miles away (Huq et al., 2016; Mani and Gunasekaran, 
2018). Social issues can directly affect people and their lives; and firms need to implement 
socially sustainable practices in their supply chains to help  “sustain” equity, safety, health, 
human rights and well-being for employees, local communities, and customers (Klassen and 
Vereecke, 2012; Huq et al., 2014; Zorzini et al., 2015). Thus, socially sustainable supply chain 
management deals with the management of social issues in the supply chain, comprised of 
human rights, health and safety considerations, and community welfare (Huq et al., 2014). 
Supply chain research into socially sustainable practices lags behind the considerable 
literature on environmentally sustainable practices (Zorzini et al., 2015). Most social studies 
have focused on the buying firm’s perspective of implementing practices and standards, with 
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comparatively few papers considering the supplier’s perspective or that of any other stakeholder 
(Jiang, 2009; Ehrgott et al., 2011; Zorzini et al., 2015). Further, the majority of the extant work 
on socially sustainable practices has been in the context of developed countries (Huq et al., 2014) 
despite the obvious relevance of this topic to developing countries, i.e., the locations to which 
many Multi-National Companies (MNCs) have outsourced (Yawar and Seuring, 2015). There is 
a need to extend the existing literature by focusing on the developing country supplier’s 
perspective in order to create a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of 
implementing socially sustainable practices across the supply chain.  
Against this backdrop, we argue that it becomes important to understand the effectiveness of 
the pressures placed upon suppliers in leading to the genuine implementation of socially 
sustainable practices. We adopt an institutional theory lens (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dimaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1988) to examine case study data collected from 
Bangladesh, both before and after the Rana Plaza collapse. We explore the pressures exerted on 
Bangladeshi suppliers by institutional actors, including foreign buyers, workers, trade unions, 
NGOs, and professional trade bodies; the effectiveness of these pressures on implementation; 
and how the pressures towards being socially sustainable have evolved over time in response to a 
critical industry event. Institutional theory posits that there is variation at the beginning of the life 
cycle of organizational phenomena, but that over time there is structuration and convergence of 
the field as firms seek to gain legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1988). This 
isomorphism occurs through mainly normative, coercive, and mimetic institutional pressures 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). But some institutional theorists 
have also acknowledged that a “decoupling” phenomenon can occur whereby an organizational 
practice is only adopted symbolically (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rogers et al., 2007; Boxenbaum 
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and Jonsson, 2008). This includes where it is formally adopted by the organization but does not 
become an established day-to-day routine. This has resonance with the recent disaster in 
Bangladesh as several factories at Rana Plaza highlighted for their social failings supplied major 
Western retailers that had strict codes of conduct seemingly in place. Two of the factories had 
passed the audit of the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) and were actively 
supplying BSCI brands at the time of the collapse (IndustriALL, 2013). 
More in-depth scrutiny into why firms decouple ethical practices and what allows them to do 
so is required (Greenwood et al., 2011). For example, Kim et al. (2016) highlighted the need to 
develop an improved understanding of supplier compliance with the ethical sourcing policies of 
buyers, including whether supplier practices change once they have been caught in unethical 
situations. Further, Wilhelm et al. (2016) asserted that there should be a special focus on the 
implementation and decoupling of socially sustainable practices, especially in suppliers based in 
developing countries and operating in very different institutional contexts. This is because, when 
compared to environmental sustainability, it is more difficult to determine the impact of social 
sustainability on performance, detect non-compliance in suppliers, and separate elements of 
social sustainability from non-economic institutions (Wilhelm et al., 2016). Therefore, in this 
paper, we ask: 
 
How do institutional pressures affect the implementation of ethical practices in suppliers situated 
in challenging institutional contexts? More specifically, what explains the decoupling of formal 
socially sustainable practices from the day-to-day reality? 
 
 A multi-case study analysis is presented of seven Bangladeshi suppliers to major European 
and North American brands. Moreover, data in the form of interviews and published reports was 
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obtained from a broad range of other actors to complement and triangulate the cases, including 
Western buyers, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), trade bodies, factory workers, and 
trade unions. We demonstrate how the suppliers have been influenced by various institutional 
pressures to implement socially sustainable practices and we identify the firm, supply chain, and 
broader environmental factors that lead to the decoupling of formal, ethical practices from the 
day-to-day ground-level realities. We also show how pressure has heightened since the Rana 
Plaza collapse, particularly in the form of horizontal collaboration between groups of buyers. 
This has implications for firms looking to diffuse ethical practices into their supply chains, 
especially into distant suppliers in very different and challenging institutional contexts. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Social Sustainability: Definition and Relevance 
Sustainability has been defined as a development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Bruntland, 1987). But 
this definition provides only a vague macro perspective that does not specify what resources are 
required by individual organizations to meet those needs (Carter and Rogers, 2008). Elkington’s 
(1998) Triple Bottom Line (TBL) perspective on sustainability includes a broader range of 
issues, including economic, environmental, and social performance. From a global supply chain 
perspective, organizations operate within a network of inter-dependent relationships and it has 
been argued that understanding the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of 
sustainability is crucial (Vachon and Klassen, 2008). There have thus been numerous 
conceptualizations of sustainability specifically in a supply chain context, including those by 
Carter and Rogers (2008) and Ahi and Searcy (2013). Meanwhile, Seuring and Müller (2008, p. 
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1700) defined sustainable supply chain management as “the management of material, 
information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply chain 
while taking goals from all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic, 
environmental and social, into account which are derived from customer and stakeholder 
requirements”.  
 It is important to consider the relationships, synergies, and trade-offs amongst the economic, 
environmental, and social “pillars” of sustainability (Hutchins and Sutherland, 2008; Haffar and 
Searcy, 2017). It is however difficult to implement all three aspects simultaneously in practice 
and to capture them all in research in order to achieve “true” sustainability (Pagell and 
Shevchenko, 2014). The trend in ethical supply chain management research has therefore been 
for studies to either focus on environmentally sustainable supply chain management (Ahi and 
Searcy, 2013) or on socially sustainable supply chain management (Huq et al., 2014). It is clear 
from the numerous recent literature reviews that upstream social issues relating to the 
human/people-side of sustainability have been under-researched when compared to the 
environmental agenda (Yawar and Seuring, 2015; Zorzini et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2016). Further, 
Touboulic and Walker (2015) noted that there has been more focus on correlations between 
environmental and economic performance than between social and economic performance 
because environmental performance is more quantifiable. Yet social sustainability requires 
further research in its own right, however challenging it might be to study the phenomenon.  
 Social issues are different from environmental issues, hence it cannot be assumed that 
findings on the environmental dimension translate to the social dimension. Social issues are more 
relevant in certain sectors (e.g., labour intensive industries) and it is harder to measure social 
performance (Zorzini et al., 2015), mainly because of the dynamic and complex nature of social 
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concerns (Yawar and Seuring, 2015). Further, it is generally easier to agree what constitutes best 
environmental practice (e.g., carbon dioxide reduction) when compared to the social dimension 
(e.g., practices concerning the use of child labor) due to cultural disparities between countries 
(Huq et al., 2014; Jia et al., in press) that mean further context-specific research is required. 
Moreover, persistent social failures (e.g., the Rana Plaza collapse) affirm that there is insufficient 
knowledge of what drives organizations to engage in socially sustainable practices and what 
limits their involvement, especially the challenges of implementing such practices in developing 
country suppliers (Yawar and Seuring, 2015). These suppliers are often situated in very different 
and challenging institutional contexts compared to their downstream supply chain partners yet, 
historically, investigation into the institutional environment and its role in implementation has 
been overlooked (Zhou et al., 2016).  
 
2.2 The Developing Country Supplier’s Institutional Context 
To understand the motivations and impediments behind the implementation of socially 
sustainable practices in developing country suppliers, we employ institutional theory as our 
overarching theoretical anchor. Institutional theory provides a framework that explains how 
organizations gradually respond to a combination of pressures from actors within their 
institutional field by converging on a set of homogeneous business practices (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Zsidisin et al., 2005), which become the legitimate 
way to organize (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). The potential of institutional theory to 
improve understanding of operations and supply chain phenomena has been identified by a 
number of authors (Kauppi, 2013). It has been used, for example, to unpack the drivers behind 
the adoption of business continuity planning procedures (Zsidisin et al., 2005), internet-enabled 
supply chain management systems (Liu et al., 2010), and inter-organizational systems across 
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multiple tiers of a healthcare supply chain (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013). But its use in the 
sustainability literature has been mainly limited to the study of environmental practices. To the 
best of our knowledge, institutional theory has not been used to study the implementation of 
socially sustainable practices (Touboulic and Walker, 2015; Zorzini et al., 2015).  
Institutional theory posits that firms adopt organizational practices mainly due to the 
following three types of pressure (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002):  
1. Coercive pressure, mainly exerted by powerful organizations within a network; it can also be 
cultural or societal.  
2. Normative pressure, stemming from professionalization and disseminated via formal 
education and professional networks. 
3. Mimetic pressure, occurring when an organization, due to uncertainty, copies the actions of 
successful competitors.  
 
A wide range of institutional actors can exert pressures that influence what becomes 
legitimate (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1988; Hoffman, 2001; Scott, 2008). The 
literature has identified buyer pressure as one of the most important factors behind the 
implementation of social standards (Maloni and Benton, 2000; Luken and Stares, 2005; Tencati 
et al., 2008; Yu, 2008). Developing country suppliers face pressure from more powerful buyers 
who make socially sustainable practices a pre-condition to obtaining orders (Marshall et al., 
2016). When an organization is highly dependent on the constituent exerting pressure, as in the 
case of Bangladeshi apparel suppliers and their Western buyers, it is considered unlikely that the 
institutional demands and expectations will be resisted (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Zhao et al., 
2008). Competition amongst suppliers can also be a major factor (Yu, 2008; Park-Poaps and 
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Rees, 2010). This may help or hinder implementation, depending on whether social 
improvements are viewed as a cost or potential source of competitive advantage.  
Internal actors, including owners/managers (Baden et al., 2009) and senior management 
(Walker and Jones, 2012), are also influential while governments can impact social conduct 
through regulation and laws (Lim and Phillips, 2008; Yu, 2008; Lee and Kim, 2009). It has also 
been suggested that NGOs (Mamic, 2005; Tsoi, 2010; Ehrgott et al., 2011) and trade unions 
(Lipschutz, 2004) play a positive role in pressurizing firms into being socially sustainable. 
Finally, professional networks, including trade bodies, can have an effect, including by providing 
education on social sustainability issues (Hoffman, 2001; Campbell, 2007).  
 
2.3 Implementation of Socially Sustainable Practices in Developing Country Suppliers 
There are various tools for implementing socially sustainable practices in supply chains, ranging 
from a buyer’s own code of conduct to third-party standards and supplier development 
programmes. There remains however a lack of knowledge in the literature on how MNCs can 
implement socially sustainable practices across their supply chains to enhance social 
performance (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Zorzini et al., 2015). Based on a thorough review of 
the supply chain ethics and sustainability literature, we identify six main composite practices. 
These six dimensions in particular were considered to be key to facilitating and encouraging 
social sustainability in developing country suppliers. Below we present a discussion on why 
these factors are important for our research context (see also Table 1, which includes a list of key 
references). 
It is known that the general attitude of suppliers towards compliance is an important factor 
(Marshall et al., 2015), which can be reflected in the scope of the practices adopted. This scope 
can vary from compliance with local laws only to complete compliance (or beyond) with buyers’ 
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own codes of conduct (Gugler and Shi, 2009) or with third-party certifications (Ciliberti et al., 
2009). Like the scope, the depth of the compliance behavior can also differ, with instances of 
suppliers carrying out ‘mock compliance’ being reported (Huq et al., 2014) and buyers 
subsequently displacing their responsibility (Eriksson and Svensson, 2016). Infrastructure within 
supplier firms to support the implementation of socially sustainable practices also varies. It has 
been found that having dedicated staff or departments dealing with the implementation of 
socially sustainable practices leads to better implementation when compared with suppliers 
having no specialized staff, where a broad human resource department is left to oversee 
implementation (Gattiker and Carter, 2010; Huq et al., 2016). The role of education and 
awareness in implementing socially sustainable practices across the firm has also been 
highlighted as a reason for better implementation (Mamic, 2005; Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010).  
Meanwhile, an inter-organizational collaborative approach can help to develop social 
sustainability implementation capabilities (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Eriksson and Svensson, 
2016). Firms can gain legitimacy by making stakeholders inclusive to the implementation 
process (Mueller et al., 2009) and the resources and capabilities that develop from such 
collaborations can lead to sustained competitive advantage, especially since these are difficult to 
imitate as they are the result of long-term, complex relationships (Gold et al., 2010). 
Finally, recent research has shown that social sustainability leadership in terms of being 
proactive and striving for the continuous development of innovative implementation tools and 
procedures leads to better implementation (Huq et al., 2016). There is however limited 
knowledge on what drives implementation efforts in suppliers, especially in developing country 
suppliers (Ehrgott et al., 2011; Gimenez and Tachizawa, 2012; Zhou et al., 2014).  




2.4 Institutional Decoupling of Socially Sustainable Practices  
The pressures exerted by institutional actors do not always lead to implementation. Instead, 
heterogeneous responses may occur, including compromise, avoidance, defiance, and 
manipulation (Oliver, 1991). Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that an organization may 
respond to institutional pressures through superficial conformity. This “decoupling” of pressure 
from expected response arises when adaptations to institutional pressures have uncertain 
efficiency consequences (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rogers et al., 2007; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 
2008), if they contradict internal efficiency needs, i.e., create potential trade-offs in priorities 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), when practices do not reflect local circumstances or realities (Scott, 
2008), or when there is information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders (Crilly et 
al., 2012). A case in point is the apparel supply chain, which included a number of incidents of 
social failure indicating a decoupling between the socially sustainable policies adopted by buyers 
and the actual implementation of socially sustainable practices in suppliers. For example, several 
factory fires led up to the collapse of the Rana Plaza in Bangladesh in 2013, including a fire in a 
factory supplying apparel to major branded clothing companies such as Wal-Mart and SEARS in 
November 2012 (Tazreen), resulting in the loss of 117 lives (Bloomberg, 2012). It was claimed 
that the Tazreen factory had been assessed by third-party auditors (New York Times, 2012) yet 
post-fire investigations revealed the factory had no emergency exits and that the gates were 
locked from the outside (BBC, 2014). It was also claimed workers were poorly trained on how to 
extinguish fires and on evacuation procedures. It seemed that, in many cases, the focal actors 
were complying superficially because being compliant legitimized their business. Suppliers were 
clearly decoupling formal compliance from ground-level organizational practices. 
Implementation may be viewed by suppliers as an extra cost, especially during constrained 
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economic times (Barnett et al., 2015). Thus, if the economic benefit of implementation is not 
apparent then suppliers can act opportunistically (Huq et al., 2014) and any action taken may be 
only a symbolic response to external legitimacy pressures.  
Institutional fields typically face multiple institutional logics – a set of material practices and 
symbolic constructions that constitute an institutional order's organizing principles (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991). These institutional logics may complement each other when synergies exist 
(Montabon et al., 2016), but they can also compete or conflict (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Thornton et al., 2012). For example, in the supply network of a sustainability-oriented 
agricultural cooperative, there can be market-oriented and community-oriented logics, which can 
co-exist but promote different behaviors (Wu and Pullman, 2015). The literature on institutional 
logics suggests that institutional pressures may lead to heterogeneous rather than homogeneous 
responses if contending logics co-exist (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Hence, the presence of 
conflicting logics has been suggested as one explanation for decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Yet further examination of how and under what circumstances such trade-offs can 
become complementary has been called for by Haffar and Searcy (2017). 
Decoupling is a well-recognized organization-level response (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 
2008). For example, opportunism has been identified as one of the reasons for ill-intentioned 
non-compliant purchasing behaviour (Karjalainen et al., 2008). It can also be due to different 
development patterns in emerging markets, including a lack of infrastructure and resources, also 
referred to as ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna et al., 2005). However, more in-depth scrutiny is 
required into why firms decouple and what allows them to do so (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Further, Rogers et al. (2007) highlighted the need to develop an improved understanding of how 
to cope with decoupling phenomena. More recently, Wilhelm et al. (2016) asserted that there 
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should be a special focus on the implementation and decoupling of socially sustainable practices 
in suppliers located in developing countries that have a different institutional context. They 
argued that, because of the inherent nature of social sustainability, it is difficult to separate out 
the institutional context while studying the implementation of social sustainability.  
It has also been suggested that critical events may shift or de-legitimize pre-existing 
institutional structures (Thornton et al., 2005), creating opportunities to re-evaluate the costs, 
trade-offs, and benefits of such organizational practices (Sine and David, 2003). Institutional 
logics are important in understanding how attitudes towards the implementation of socially 
sustainable practices are evolving over time in response to critical industry events. In the context 
of social sustainability, the two relevant logics are argued to be the economic and social logics. 
Institutional logics have been studied at the societal, field, and industry level; but very little 
systematic attention has been paid to how individual organizations react to the multiplicity and 
incompatibility of logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). Meanwhile, the studies by Rogers et al. 
(2007) and Wu and Pagell (2011) on competing logics/priorities used static or cross-sectional 
data. They did not explore how logics/priorities evolve over time. It is argued here to be 
important to investigate how logics interplay and evolve in developing country supplier firms as 
events take place to influence the implementation of socially sustainable practices. 
Thus, more empirical research into the determinants and deterrents behind implementing 
ethical practices in developing country suppliers, particularly socially sustainable practices, is 
necessary (Blome and Paulraj, 2013). These major themes from institutional theory lay the 
foundations for us to explore our research questions concerning how institutional pressures affect 
the implementation of socially sustainable practices in suppliers situated in challenging 
institutional contexts; and what explains the decoupling of such formal organizational practices 
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from the day-to-day reality. We contend that this is the logical first step as these antecedents may 
become contingency factors in future social sustainability-performance relationship studies. 
 
3. Methodology 
The nascent state of the literature on socially sustainable practices, especially in a developing 
country supplier context, called for an exploratory study (Saunders et al., 2009). The case study 
method is therefore suitable as it allows for the thorough examination of this complex, real-life 
issue on which little prior empirical evidence is available, leading to new, in-depth insights 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Edmondson and Mcmanus, 2007; Yin, 2009). Further, it supports our 
extraction of rich data through a range of techniques (e.g., interviews, observations, and 
document analysis) and facilitates cross-validation (Seuring, 2008; Yin, 2009). A multiple case 
study approach is adopted here, which can aid external validity, guard against observer bias 
(Voss et al., 2002; Barratt et al., 2011), aid triangulation, and create more testable and robust 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
 
3.1 Research Context and Case Selection 
Bangladesh is a major international player in the labor-intensive apparel sector and has been the 
subject of much public scrutiny. This developing country exported apparel worth $28 billion in 
2015/16, second only to China (McKinsey, 2011; BGMEA, 2016). However, since 2005, nearly 
2,000 apparel workers have reportedly died in industrial accidents in Bangladesh (CNN, 2013). 
For example, the Spectrum factory collapse killed 64 people in 2005, the Hameem Group factory 
fire killed 29 people in 2010, and the Rana Plaza collapse killed 1,129 people in 2013. These 
tragic events have been linked to social failings yet the factories in question had successfully 
passed various audit checks suggesting a disconnection between the formal adoption of socially 
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sustainable practices and the ground-level reality. Thus, the apparel sector in Bangladesh is 
suitable for studying the phenomenon of the adoption of ethical practices in a developing 
country, in particular the adoption (and decoupling) of socially sustainable practices.  
 We focused on the developing country supplier’s perspective as it was evident from the 
literature that this required more scrutiny (Zorzini et al., 2015). In particular, we sought to 
understand how adoption in developing country suppliers is influenced by institutional pressures 
and why, where relevant, the ground realities have been decoupled from formal, audited 
practices. Thus, the unit of analysis was the supplier firm interpreted in the institutional context 
of a developing nation. 
Consistent with theoretical sampling, cases were selected opportunistically, i.e., according to 
their ability to generate new insights that would help in the development of theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Firms were selected from the Bangladeshi apparel industry that were known to supply 
international customers, i.e., MNCs sourcing from Bangladesh with a minimum revenue of $3 
billion. Fourteen supplier firms were approached but were only included if multiple interviewees 
were available and on-site access was provided. This facilitated triangulation and allowed for 
observations to inform data collection and interpretation. Further, the set of cases was limited to 
supplier firms where interviews could also take place in at least one of its international buyers to 
provide further triangulation. In total, seven suppliers were studied that met the criteria. These 
seven cases were enough to reach a satisfactory level of theoretical saturation. For example, as 
data collection approached the end, evidence to support the introduction of new categories of 
decoupling could not be found. Rather, new evidence only confirmed previously identified 
categories. Data collection therefore stopped as additional data would not have increased our 




3.2 Data Collection 
Data collection took place between December 2011 and May 2015. We followed Yin’s (2009) 
call for multiple sources of evidence. The primary sources were 19 semi-structured interviews 
conducted before the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013 with managers from the seven supplier firms 
(see Table 2). These interviews focused on current social sustainability attitudes and related 
pressures. For instance, on the issue of institutional pressures faced by supplier firms, we asked 
what the interviewees thought were the roles of the different institutional actors in exerting 
pressure and how they would describe this type of pressure. On the decoupling dimension, for 
example, we tried to determine what kinds of challenges the interviewees were facing in 
adopting buyers’ social standards and asked them to describe the implementation process. We 
also probed their motivations and efforts to make their business more socially sustainable. The 
interviews were supplemented by supplier factory tours and secondary data, e.g., audit reports 
and news articles. These additional sources were used to inform our understanding of the 
institutional context and helped us to validate the insights that we received from our primary 
interviewees.  
A further 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted with other relevant institutional 
actors (see also Table 2). The core set of seven supplier cases was supplemented by evidence 
from six different buyers from North America and Europe, with apparel sales ranging from $3bn 
to over $20bn. Evidence was also collected from one local and one international Chamber of 
Commerce, an apparel trade body, two trade unions, and two NGOs. In addition, two Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs: FGD1 and FGD2) were conducted with apparel industry workers 
with industry experience ranging from 1 to 16 years. FGD1 consisted of 12 workers from 10 
different suppliers and FGD2 consisted of 9 workers from 9 different suppliers. These FGDs 
 17 
 
were conducted in two separate locations, where there was a concentration of apparel suppliers, 
and they did not include any employees from the seven case firms. These additional sources of 
data represented many of the institutional actors exerting pressure on implementation. The 
supplementary interviews provided context and helped obtain both a balanced view and a 
comprehensive picture of the institutional environment. They also helped us stay objective and 
triangulate collected information from supplier interviewees with opposing or confirmatory 
arguments. For example, Table 6 later provides a description of the decoupling coding categories 
(first column) and the third and fourth columns illustrate how we used the data from these 
supplementary interviews (buyers and other institutional actors) to triangulate each decoupling 
factor with the suppliers (second column). 
 On average, each interview lasted 45 minutes and most were audio-recorded or accompanied 
by comprehensive note-taking. Most interviews were conducted in English (except those with 
the workers and lower management) as English is widely used in business conversations and 
communication in Bangladesh (Mundi, 2011; Uk Trade & Investment, 2015). However, during 
the interviews there would be interjections or further explanations in the Bengali language to add 
a more informal and conversational style. Where necessary, these were then translated into 
English by the first author who is fluent in both Bangla and English and thus there were no 
problems with comprehension. Unclear issues were clarified through follow-up e-mails or 
telephone calls. Initial interviewees were identified through personal contacts and referrals from 
a previous interviewee, ensuring participants were both accessible and cooperative (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). Time was spent building trust with the interviewees to enable ‘frank and open’ 
discussions, which would otherwise have been difficult given the sensitive nature of the research. 
This was also aided by the first author and interviewer being a Bangladeshi native.  
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[Take in Table 2] 
   
 During the data collection period, the industry suffered a major disaster – the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza building. This was the world's deadliest industrial incident since the 1984 Bhopal 
disaster in India, as well as being the deadliest structural failure in modern human history, killing 
almost 1,200 people. Even though other failures had occurred in the industry, they were nowhere 
near on this magnitude. Such critical events can trigger institutional change and industry 
evolution (Thornton et al., 2005) thereby creating prospects for institutional actors to re-evaluate 
the costs and benefits of existing practices (Sine and David, 2003). This offered a unique 
opportunity to study first-hand the evolution of industry pressures and their effect on the 
implementation of socially sustainable practices, which would not be possible in environments of 
stasis. Further, this enabled us to conduct a before-and-after analysis of the change in pressures 
and the subsequent effect on decoupling. These kinds of opportunities are very rare, especially in 
qualitative studies. 
 According to Eisenhardt (1989), if an opportunity presents itself to take advantage of the 
uniqueness of a specific case and provide new theoretical insights, then researchers can make 
alterations during the data collection process through “controlled opportunism” (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 539). This is essentially what we did when the Rana Plaza disaster occurred; but it was 
understandably not possible to obtain perfect symmetry between the before and after data (Huq 
et al., 2016). New (2015) acknowledged that, in researching unsustainable social practices, 
researchers might find the data harder to collect and it could be necessary to adopt certain 
‘investigative journalist’ approaches. As expected, given the sensitivity of the issues covered, 
access became more difficult and respondents were more reluctant to share information, thus it 
was not possible to conduct further interviews in all seven suppliers. Through our interactions 
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during the first round of data collection before the Rana Plaza collapse, we were able to gain 
trust and build comparatively stronger relationships with four of the seven suppliers allowing us 
to conduct an additional eight post-disaster interviews in these firms. These suppliers were more 
willing to be involved with the study and, after the Rana Plaza disaster, the relevance of the topic 
became more evident to them.  
 This sub-set sample of four cases was however balanced as it covered suppliers showing a 
low, moderate, and high level of social sustainability performance, as explained fully in Section 
3.3. It included the best and worst performing suppliers in terms of their level of social 
sustainability and two moderates (see Table 3). The two polar cases (high vs. low) facilitated 
building theory on success and failure in implementing socially sustainable practices in 
challenging institutional contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989) while the two moderates helped us cover 
the entire spectrum and address issues of confirmability and credibility by increasing variance in 
the data (Wu et al., 2010).  
 To conduct more substantive and critical work while investigating controversial social 
failures, it has been suggested that researchers should try to incorporate a wider view, i.e., to 
include more sources of information than the firms themselves and to try to understand the 
broader institutional context of the phenomena under exploration (New, 2015). Therefore, 
similar to data collection before the Rana Plaza disaster, the post-Rana supplier interviews were 
also augmented by ten further interviews in four of the buyers, two NGOs, one labor union, and 
the Apparel Trade Body (see Table 2). However, we were unable to re-instate the FGDs in this 
phase and, besides, it would not have been possible to gain collective access to the same group of 
workers as many were migrant workers from remote regions and the rate of labour turnover is 
quite high (McKinsey, 2011).  
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 Since some of the interviews took place shortly after this critical industry event, there is a 
chance that interviewees gave ‘knee-jerk’ reactions, leading to biased data through retrospective 
sense-making by image-conscious informants. However, it is argued that the risk of this is 
minimized as our data came from a range of highly knowledgeable institutional actors that 
viewed the focal phenomena from different perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis followed procedures recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles et al. (2014). 
Specific techniques were followed to establish rigor through confirmability, dependability, 
credibility, and transferability. Based on the transcripts, interviewer notes, and secondary data, 
we first compiled individual case studies for supplier firms, including their level of social 
compliance and the types of institutional pressure they were facing. As there were no established 
criteria for measuring the level of social sustainability implementation, we used six proxies 
identified from the literature (see Section 2.2) to gauge the level of social sustainability of 
supplier firms, including their general attitude towards compliance (e.g., with local laws and 
buyer/third-party codes of conduct), the depth of their compliance, the social sustainability 
infrastructure within the firm, and inter-organizational/collaborative approaches to social 
sustainability (see Table 1). The laggards – Supplier 1 and 2 – were rated low on all six criteria, 
while the leader – Supplier 7 – scored high on all six criteria. Those suppliers having a moderate 
level of implementation – Suppliers 3 to 6 – were rated medium on the majority of criteria (i.e., 
no more than two criteria rated either high or low). We then expanded the individual case 
descriptions by adding the factors leading to the suppliers decoupling social sustainability 
implementation, where relevant. We looked for evidence of barriers, challenges, and 
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impediments that were limiting adoption. This resulted in thick descriptions of each firm’s level 
of social compliance, institutional pressures, and decoupling factors. 
Transcripts from each interview were coded and analyzed using QSR NVivo10 ©, which 
helped to systematically organize the data and be transparent by providing an audit trail (Fielding 
and Lee, 1998; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Using such computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software can enhance a researcher’s reflexivity. For example, by using memos, researchers can 
track the development of their analytical logic and raise their awareness of how they interpreted 
the data (Woods et al., 2016). After all interviews had been transcribed, the formal coding 
process began. There was however a degree of overlap between data collection and analysis, 
which is virtually unavoidable in qualitative research (Pratt, 2009). For example, pilot interviews 
were carried out initially in two of the suppliers. Pilot studies are important as they pre-test 
research instruments such as the interview schedule; and the findings can be used to refine the 
research questions and generate new themes (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). Interim analysis of the pilot data helped to improve the focus of the research 
objective, identify possible theoretical lenses, and refine the interview guide. 
All of the transcripts were read by the first author and a sample was read by the second 
author. We looked for patterns based on frequency, commonalities, and differences (Saldaña, 
2013). A coding frame was developed after discussion, and the transcripts were coded by the 
first author. Then the second author went through the codes to check for consistency, according 
to our definitions of the institutional pressures faced by suppliers and the decoupling factors. 
These were then compared and disagreements discussed. The coding frame was changed when 
new codes emerged and the above process was followed again until consensus was reached on 
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the final list of codes. Such rigorous coding allowed us to develop analytical categories, which 
were then conceptualized into theoretical dimensions, as described below. 
To begin with, a descriptive, working set of codes was produced based on the themes 
identified from the literature on institutional pressures. In theory building research, such a 
provisional specification of codes can facilitate analysis and provide stronger empirical 
grounding for emergent theory if the codes prove to be important in answering the research 
questions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saldaña, 2013). The sources of coercive, mimetic, and normative 
pressure on each of the suppliers were identified from the cases. Interviewees within each case 
were cross-referenced to triangulate the data. The pressures exerted on each supplier were 
analyzed and cross-case analysis was undertaken, with the suppliers organized according to their 
perceived degree of social sustainability. The pressures were then further analyzed to arrive at a 
more interpretive level of coding. For example, formal education was initially identified as a 
normative pressure leading to adoption (level-one code ‘NOR-EDU’). But as the analysis 
proceeded, accounts of normative pressure were seen interpretively as involving elements of 
education, training, and awareness-building of owners/mid-management and workers. Therefore, 
the initial descriptive code was elaborated to distinguish between the education of workers 
(‘NOR-EDU-WOR’) and owners/mid-management (‘NOR-EDU-MNG’). The information 
obtained from interviews was validated by checking documents, focus group findings, and 
observation notes. Converging perspectives of suppliers and other institutional actors were 
identified and, where applicable, differences were discussed. 
In the second analytical stage, we applied theory building, which enabled us to induce 
categories of decoupling factors. An initial broad set of codes was first taken from the literature, 
such as conflict in logics and disparity in socio-economic contexts. Then, analytical categories 
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were inductively derived from the data through an iterative process. At this stage, the interview 
transcripts were reviewed in detail to detect patterns and regularities. Coding was used to 
identify the factors leading to decoupling, with data coded as a decoupling factor if it met at least 
one of the following conditions: (1) it was clearly intended by the supplier as a symbolic action, 
in that the supplier actively tried to circumvent the buyer’s social standards or made cosmetic 
changes to pass the social audit in response to institutional pressures; (2) it was perceived as a 
symbolic action by the researchers; and/or, (3) there was disconnect between adopted and actual 
practices due to local circumstances. Through constant comparison and interpretation, we were 
able to inductively derive seven subcategories of decoupling in the data (Eisenhardt et al., 2016): 
(1) conflict in suppliers’ economic and social logics; (2) preparedness to mock comply by 
suppliers; (3) overlooking of violations by buyers; (4) adversarial relationships with auditors; (5) 
lack of supply chain visibility; (6) cultural and socio-economic disparity with Western 
incompatible codes of conduct; and, (7) lack of government enforcement of the law. The 
categories were constructed to reflect as many of the nuances in the data as possible. 
The evidence that emerged from the data suggested that these decoupling factors could be 
described according to three theoretical dimensions: firm related, supply chain related, and 
environment related factors. For example, we grouped conflict in suppliers’ economic and social 
logics and preparedness to mock comply into firm related decoupling factors. Similarly, we 
grouped cultural and socio-economic disparity with Western codes of conduct and a lack of 
government enforcement of the law together because these factors were related to the 
institutional environment in which the suppliers were operating. This process of building theory 
on decoupling factors is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure identifies key codes from the literature 
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and links them to the more specific codes inductively derived from the data that feed into the 
three aggregate theoretical dimensions of decoupling. 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
A key aspect of qualitative data analysis is removing doubt surrounding the reliability and 
validity of qualitatively-produced findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Hence, multiple steps 
have been undertaken to ensure reliability and validity, including data triangulation via site 
visits, document analyses, and multiple interviews (Stake, 1995; Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2009). 
Finally, cross-case analysis was undertaken to search for patterns, i.e., similarities and 
differences between the coded categories across the seven suppliers. For example, some 
categories such as buyer coercive pressure revealed no clear patterns, but others such as 
normative pressure through the education of workers led to important patterns of within-group 
similarity and cross-group differences. This systematic analysis of our case data aided in 
ensuring rigor thereby increasing confidence in our findings.  
 
4. Findings Pre-Rana Plaza Collapse: Institutional Pressures and Decoupling Factors 
4.1 Cross-Case Analysis of Institutional Pressures Affecting Implementation 
4.1.1 Coercive Pressures on Suppliers 
The string of major industry disasters, even prior to the Rana Plaza collapse, had intensified 
pressure on buyers, who were in turn able to exert greater coercive pressure on suppliers. As a 
consequence, the most significant coercive pressure imposed on all seven suppliers was from 
buyers who made reaching certain social standards an order qualifier. This can be clearly seen in 
Table 3, which shows the frequency of each type of institutional pressure mentioned by the 
suppliers; and in Table 4, which shows through illustrative quotes the effectiveness of 
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institutional pressures towards the implementation of socially sustainable practices. There was 
also coercive pressure from the Bangladeshi Apparel Trade Body, which checked on issues like 
child labor and fire safety. Action was taken against non-compliant factories, with gross 
violations leading to loss of membership. The Local Chamber of Commerce Director noted 
however that the trade body’s surveillance resources were stretched due to the sector’s enormous 
size: 5,700 factories with over 3,000 trade body members.  
Tables 3 and 4 also contain pressures that were identified as important in the literature but that 
did not appear important in the cases. For instance, the literature suggests that coercive pressure 
from other institutional actors like the government, trade unions, and NGOs plays a key role in 
promoting sustainable supply chain management. Yet our data suggests these sources were less 
prominent and often ineffective. For example, although government officials inspected supplier 
factories, it was alleged that they were often corrupt. Supplier 1’s Compliance Manager 
recounted: “The government labor agency comes to audit every 6 months, but mainly they come 
for money. They see violations, but if you bribe them, they go away.” This reflects the context in 
which the supplier factories are embedded. Indeed, although it has improved its position 
somewhat, Bangladesh has been ranked consistently near the bottom (1-15) of the Corruption 
Perceptions Index for the last 15 years (Transparency International, 2016). Therefore, although 
on the surface the country’s labor laws appeared strict, buyers had to take on the responsibility 
for implementation because these laws were not enforced. 
One might expect trade unions to be a key institutional actor at the interface between workers, 
suppliers, and buyers, yet none of the seven suppliers had an internal trade union. The suppliers 
suggested this was because unions become ‘politicized’. Rather than looking after workers’ 
welfare, suppliers claimed union leaders call unnecessary strikes and hold owners to ransom. In 
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contrast, during the focus group discussions the workers revealed that they faced various 
challenges from management if they wanted to form trade unions. For example, some workers 
disclosed that they had faced intimidation, lost their job or been forced to resign when they asked 
about unionization. Similar to trade unions, none of the suppliers reported any coercive pressure 
from NGOs. Rather, they claimed NGOs have hidden agendas, and that they sometimes try to 
incite worker unrest for their own financial gain. Supplier 2’s HR Manager stated: “An NGO is 
blackmailing us for money, or else they will cause worker disturbance in our factory… They 
work for their own interests – if the factory shuts down, the workers are the losers”.  
4.1.2 Mimetic Pressures on Suppliers   
In the literature, the discussion regarding mimetic pressure on suppliers is generally related to 
competition. Our cross-case analysis reinterpreted mimetic pressures on suppliers by 
distinguishing them into: (i) competition for orders from buyers; and, (ii) competition for the 
limited available skilled labor force. Typically, suppliers copied rival firms to compete for 
orders, but because there was a shortage of skilled labor, firms were also having to implement 
social standards to retain workers and were having to improve their social sustainability 
performance to attract better workers. This mimetic pressure for skilled labor and orders was 
primarily due to an increase in the number of factories from 3,480 in 2000/01 to 5,700 in 
2011/12 (BGMEA, 2016). Specifically in terms of employee retention, workers in both FGDs 
referred to cases where higher standards in neighboring factories had been used as leverage to 
pressurize management into providing similar conditions. This mimetic pressure was almost 
‘enforced’ on the suppliers, as explained by the workers from the FGDs: “Workers create 
awareness amongst themselves and then pressurise the factories to be more compliant” (FGD 
2); and, “Yes, I will go where I will get better facilities” (FGD 1). These examples illustrate the 
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importance of social conditions to workers and inform where they choose to work. They also 
demonstrate how, in a market where labor is in shortage, these actors whose voices are rarely 
heard have a certain degree of power.  
From Table 3, it can be seen that Supplier 7 did not report any mimetic pressure, be it due to 
orders or workers. Since they were the trailblazers in the industry, others were benchmarking 
against them, i.e., Supplier 7 was the source of mimetic pressure on other suppliers. This placed 
Supplier 7 in a unique position. They did not have to compete for orders or workers, but they did 
face negative pressure from poorly performing suppliers. For example, Supplier 7 had 
implemented a profit-sharing scheme for workers and received significant push-back from their 
neighboring factories (competitors). NGO1’s Operations Director – who collaborated with 
Supplier 7 on this project – explained: “Sometimes, a factory that wants to improve standards 
faces resistance from their less compliant neighbors who pressurize the proactive supplier not to 
give benefits since, if his neighbor implements such practices, then he will be forced to do the 
same.” Thus, negative pressure on proactive suppliers from competitors to be less socially 
sustainable is a potential barrier to the diffusion of socially sustainable practices.  
 
4.1.3 Normative Pressures on Suppliers 
The level of education and awareness in the institutional field varies according to factors such as 
age and hierarchical position, and this contributes to shaping attitudes towards social 
sustainability. Most Bangladeshi factories are family-run, where the first generation of owners 
had a low level of education. Similarly, the majority of mid-level managers had no specialized 
education and learned primarily through experience. Hence, their attitude was often similar to 
that of the first generation owners. More recently, a second generation had emerged with a 
higher level of education, often gained from international universities, and with a different 
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outlook towards social sustainability. This was a trend that we observed in our sample. For 
example, the four suppliers rated as having moderate levels of social sustainability had the 
second generation playing an active role in management, whereas suppliers 1 and 2 – with low 
levels of social sustainability implementation – did not. Supplier 7 – the only supplier with a 
rating of high – was an outlier, i.e., its owner is a first-generation entrepreneur, but he was 
educated at one of the top universities in Bangladesh and exhibited superior social logic 
compared to the other owners. For example, Supplier 7 regularly publishes an annual Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Report; is a signatory of the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC), which asks companies to support core values in the areas of human rights, 
labor standards, etc.; and is a member of the Fair Labor Association (FLA). These initiatives, 
which go beyond what is required by buyers’ social standards, have resulted in Supplier 7 
winning numerous prestigious sustainability awards.  
 At the lower hierarchical levels, there was evidence of limited education being provided by 
NGOs who made workers aware of labor laws, health and safety protocols, and how to undertake 
collective bargaining. This however did not translate into a credible source of normative pressure 
on suppliers. There was also a lack of genuine training of their workers by suppliers. According 
to workers in FGD2, suppliers only educated them on issues that were in the suppliers’ own 
interest; for example, by educating workers on the minimum notice period and not on severance 
pay rights. Again, the exception was Supplier 7, which had separate departments that conducted 
worker orientation programs.  
Finally, the Apparel Trade Body served to propagate normative rules about socially 
sustainable practices. It had created a social compliance department and collaborated with 
numerous buyers – including Buyer 4 and Buyer 6 – to make and distribute educational films 
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amongst suppliers for workers and management on fire safety. This initiative, which started 
before the Tazreen fire that killed more than 100 workers in November 2012, was commended 
by workers, NGOs, suppliers, and buyers alike. 
[Take in Table 3 and Table 4] 
 
4.2 Cross-Case Analysis of Decoupling Factors 
As we have seen in the previous section, the most significant pressure on suppliers’ social 
sustainability performance came from buyers, who introduced stringent codes of conduct. Many 
of the suppliers interviewed had successfully become approved suppliers to major international 
retailers, allowing them to continue to win orders. Nonetheless, problems clearly remained, as 
was evident from the Tazreen factory fire just five months before the Rana Plaza collapse.  
In this section, we unbundle the factors leading to decoupling into firm, supply chain, and 
environment related factors. Table 5 shows the types of decoupling factor evident in each 
supplier while Table 6 provides a description of the decoupling coding categories and illustrates 
through quotes from suppliers, buyers, and other institutional actors how each decoupling factor 
was triangulated. 
[Take in Table 5 and Table 6] 
 
4.2.1 Firm-Related Decoupling Factors 
Conflict in Suppliers’ Economic and Social Logic 
Implementing socially sustainable practices in the Bangladeshi apparel sector involves 
attempting to elevate the social logic – and the need to improve social standards – in supplier 
factories where decision making has been largely dictated by the economic logic of maximizing 
profits. Historically, the economic logic has dominated to such a degree that it has been to the 
 30 
 
detriment of social (and ecological) conditions (Montabon et al., 2016). Thus, a key cause of 
decoupling – despite the risks to reputation, credibility, and business – was perceived conflict 
between the economic and social logics. For example, many suppliers were not willing to make 
the required investment in genuine implementation because of the short-term impact on 
profitability and the unwillingness of buyers to share in the costs of implementation. Suppliers 
also described how buyers appeared to be in conflict themselves – wanting to source from 
compliant factories but not pay higher prices. Supplier 5’s CEO argued: “A compliant factory 
cannot compete on price with a non-compliant factory… [some] buyers are still buying 
knowingly from non-compliant factories because of lower prices.”  
Many suppliers that perceived there to be conflict between the economic and social logics 
sought out buyers prepared to source from non-compliant factories (e.g., Supplier 1 and 2). But 
this set of buyers was reducing in number over time. Other suppliers (suppliers 3 to 6) were 
reluctant adopters that could not see the benefit of social sustainability but were coerced into 
implementation. These firms were the most likely to decouple or superficially comply. In such 
suppliers, isomorphism was leading to the formal adoption of socially sustainable practices (as 
assessed through audits) but not necessarily to their genuine, day-to-day implementation. A 
minority of suppliers, like Supplier 7, were proactive early adopters who had already begun to 
build their competitive strategy around social sustainability. Supplier 7’s Head of Sustainability 
described how being socially sustainable was improving the company’s reputation and helping to 
attract more customers, including those focused more on quality than cost. For these firms, the 
economic and social logics were perceived as being complementary, with socially sustainable 




Preparedness to Mock Comply by Suppliers 
A second factor within the suppliers that contributed to decoupling was a preparedness or 
cultural acceptance within the firms to mock comply. Mock compliance is the key manifestation 
within the cases of decoupling, but this cannot easily by achieved by one or two individuals – it 
often relies on many actors within the suppliers going along with the charade. Audits against 
codes of conduct and third-party certifications (on employee wages and benefits, child and 
forced labor, workplace harassment, working hours and conditions, etc.) could be surprise visits 
but were usually scheduled, allowing suppliers to prepare and control the audit environment. 
There are several examples in the data of mock compliance involving various actors within the 
suppliers. This includes:   
· Hiding violations: For example, maintaining multiple timesheets to hide working-hour 
violations. Fake, compliant timesheets are shown to inspectors while genuine, non-compliant 
timesheets are used by the payroll department. Suppliers claimed they cannot simultaneously 
limit overtime and meet tight lead times. They also claimed adhering to overtime limits would 
contribute to worker migration. Supplier 7’s Director explained: “when I capped overtime, I 
lost 20 to 30% of my workers [to competitors who were allowing more overtime so workers 
could increase their earnings]. So we made a deal with the workers: you can do more overtime 
but, when the buyer comes, you cannot tell them you do more than 2 hours.”  
· Short term, superficial conformance: For example, complying for audit-day only. This 
includes only opening the required childcare center, having doctors on site, and supplying 
safety equipment and uniforms on audit day. Although some buyers attempt surprise audits to 
stop this practice, Trade Union 2’s President explained: “suppliers bribe the auditor’s driver. 
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The driver is instructed by the supplier to inform them when the auditors are coming for 
surprise visits. The corruption has reached such a level!”  
· More blatant cheating: For example, supplier representatives taking auditors to their fully 
compliant factory before spreading orders over their other, non-compliant factories where 
they can produce more cheaply.  
 
4.2.2 Supply Chain Related Decoupling Factors 
Overlooking of Violations by Buyers 
Some interviewees suggested buyers are complicit in mock compliance. One example concerns 
working-hour violations, with suppliers claiming buyers ‘turn a blind-eye’. The Human Resource 
Managers of suppliers 1 and 2 alleged some auditors are aware – but ignore – the fact that most 
Bangladeshi factories are open on Fridays despite it being a holiday. Indeed, interviewees from 
buyers 2, 4, and 5 acknowledged knowing about working-hour violations. They claimed such 
violations cannot be completely eliminated and that it is better to work with suppliers on these 
issues rather than to penalize them, as the latter only leads to violations being hidden. Another 
example concerns cotton from Uzbekistan. This cotton is banned due to the alleged use of 
children and convicts to pick the cotton, but it was claimed buyers are aware it is still being used. 
 
Adversarial Relationships with Auditors 
Another factor contributing to decoupling concerns the actor responsible for the audit and the 
nature of the relationship between the supplier and the actor. Audits conducted by buyers directly 
are perceived as being softer than those conducted by third parties that act on behalf of the buyer. 
The marked difference in perceptions of the two types of audits and auditors contributes to 
decoupling behavior. While some buyers may overlook certain types of violations, as above, or 
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take a developmental approach to retain good relations with the supplier and gradually improve 
their social performance, it was claimed that third-party auditors are much stricter meaning 
suppliers try to hide violations from them. The suppliers perceived the third-party auditors as 
being driven by their own economic incentives, failing factories so they could return a second 
time and receive a second fee from the buyer. The MD of Supplier 2 claimed that third-party 
auditors ‘terrorise the factories and do policing duty’ and have a preconceived notion that the 
factory is being very unfair and unjust towards the workers; whereas the buyer’s own auditors 
“talk very frankly” and “behave like partners”. Similarly, the HR Manager of Supplier 3 
explained that the buyers’ auditors are changing their attitude from “policing duty” to “factory 
development”.  
 
Lack of Supply Chain Visibility  
Extended global supply chains that make it difficult to maintain traceability create a context in 
which decoupling can develop. It was claimed the use of intermediaries that procure on a buyer’s 
behalf contribute to decoupling. They often source from cheaper, non-compliant suppliers to 
increase their profit share without informing the buyer. Meanwhile, suppliers may subcontract 
work to other, non-compliant factories without the buyer’s knowledge. Supplier 7’s Director 
explained: “Sometimes, we get greedy and take on more orders than our capacity. We then have 
to outsource to less compliant factories who have lower overhead costs ... Some factories – by 
subcontracting work to other, smaller factories – keep their hands clean but dirty those of 
others.” Many buyers are aware that social sustainability needs diffusing further upstream yet 
the focus of audits is often exclusively on the immediate supplier. Those that have tried to 
evaluate tier-two suppliers or investigate the use of subcontracting have been obstructed. Indeed, 
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Supplier 2’s Human Resource Manager admitted: “we don’t want them to go and check the 
compliance of our suppliers [second tier] as it will create extra complications.”  
 
4.2.3 Environment Related Decoupling Factors 
Cultural & Socio-Economic Disparity with Western Standards 
Codes of conduct are typically based on Western experiences and do not reflect the cultural and 
socio-economic environment of a developing country like Bangladesh. This contributes to the 
decoupling phenomenon – some factories will mock comply simply to match up to requirements 
that go against local practices. This results, for example, in audit-day charades involving the use 
of childcare centers, which are not culturally accepted; and in falsifying timesheets so suppliers 
can provide workers with higher rate overtime. But while it has been alleged buyers have ignored 
‘minor’ violations, they will not compromise on child labor. This is undeniably the right course 
of action when examining the apparel industry in isolation, but the issue is more complex when 
Bangladesh is considered as a whole. Our data suggests child labor has been displaced from 
garment factories to other, less regulated and more hazardous industries like construction. 
Supplier 3’s Managing Director stated: “There is child labor in almost all other industries in 
Bangladesh. The children were not doing hard labor in garment factories, but now it has been 
banned, they are going into more dangerous professions, which are not monitored.” Without a 
coordinated response – which is likely to require government involvement – it is questionable 
whether this aspect of a code of conduct actually reduces child exploitation. 
 
Lack of Government Enforcement of the Law 
Finally, our data previously demonstrated that corruption is rife in the government agencies 
responsible for enforcing social standards. Further, it has been alleged that the government 
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provides little support for social sustainability initiatives, perhaps due to its limited law 
enforcement resources. The unusual institutional environment of a developing country has 
implications for the diffusion of social sustainability. Since buyers do not receive the same level 
of government support as in a developed country, there is scope for decoupling. 
 
5. Findings Post-Rana Plaza Collapse: Theorizing How Change in Pressure Affects Decoupling 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
“A jolt has to happen for Bangladesh to take this [social sustainability] seriously”. [Before 
Rana Plaza Disaster]  
 
“I think Rana Plaza was the jolt that I told you about before ... a lot of improvements will now 
happen in Bangladesh”. [After Rana Plaza Disaster] 




What would be the state of the apparel industry in Bangladesh if the Rana Plaza disaster had not 
occurred? Our study would have ended at the previous section after the identification of the 
institutional pressures and decoupling factors. Yet the above insightful and eerie prophecy from 
the Country Manager of Buyer 3 demonstrates that a shock of this magnitude was almost 
inevitable and that it was sadly required as a catalyst to create a sudden step-change in attitudes 
towards implementing socially sustainable practices. In this section, we use data collected after 
the collapse (see Table 2) to show how the institutional pressures on Bangladeshi suppliers have 




5.1 Change in Coercive Pressures and the Effect on Decoupling 
After the Rana Plaza collapse, a new phenomenon emerged – major collective action led by 
groups of buyers. Two groups in particular were formed. Accord consisted of over 160 mainly 
European buyers that now worked together with global and local trade unions, supported by 
NGOs. The other group, Alliance, brought together 26 North American apparel brands and trade 
associations. The two groups use similar standards to conduct fire, electrical, and structural 
safety audits of suppliers, while Accord has also pledged to contribute towards the costs of 
improvements. Three out of the four suppliers interviewed after the collapse fell under the 
governance of at least one of these groups. The groups started to make their audit reports 
publicly available, placing greater coercive pressure on suppliers – essentially naming and 
shaming non-compliant factories.  
Collective action meant the repercussions of failing an audit were severe: not just one, but a 
whole group of buyers would no longer source from a supplier. Factories that did not meet the 
standards were effectively being shut down. Supplier 3’s DMD conceded: “adhering to the new 
standards is a matter of survival. If you do not pass, either you lose the business or the worst 
case scenario is you are forced to shut down.” Similarly, Supplier 6’s Director explained: “We 
have no option but to make costly changes. It might cost us around $350,000… but it is a 
requirement I have to fulfil.” Such collective, coercive pressure by buyers served to make social 
and economic logics in developing country suppliers more closely connected. Thus, social logic 
was heightened, even if the economic logic continued to dominate. These findings extend 
previous research on how powerful buyers can promulgate change in suppliers (Benton and 




Proposition 1: Collective coercive pressure from horizontal collaboration between buyers 
(including more transparent group audit-reporting) reduces the conflict in social and economic 
logic, thus lowering the propensity of developing country suppliers to decouple and leading to a 
higher level of social sustainability implementation. 
 
 Collective coercive buyer pressure also helped to mitigate decoupling caused by the lack of 
law enforcement that previously undermined implementation. Supplier 3’s DMD explained: 
“The biggest change was brought about by Alliance and Accord. If the buyers, suppliers, or the 
government for that matter, wanted to do this individually through their own inspections they 
would never have been able to do what these two organizations have done”. In effect, the two 
groups of buyers were playing a quasi-governmental role since the government was unable or 
unwilling to fulfil this function. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Collective coercive pressure from horizontal collaboration between buyers that 
effectively replaces government regulation reduces the propensity of developing country 
suppliers to decouple, leading to a higher level of social sustainability implementation. 
 
 Suppliers with a low level of social sustainability implementation (e.g., Supplier 1) appeared 
to be unable to overcome the apparent conflict between the social and economic logics, even 
after the disaster. Further, they did not possess the capabilities to make the more expensive 
improvements now demanded collectively by buyers, who were also trying to reduce their 
supplier bases and levels of risk exposure by procuring from (fewer) larger and more compliant 
suppliers only. The number of suppliers reduced from 5,876 in 2012/13 to 4,328 in 2015/16 
(BGMEA, 2016). In fact, the Director of Supplier 1 disclosed to us that they had decided to end 
their business as a direct result of their inability to cope with increased buyer requirements after 
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Rana Plaza. She stated: “Rana Plaza had a direct impact on our decision of shutting down the 
business. We do not have our own building [it is rented] and some of the compliance issues like 
having extra staircases cannot be solved. So we will fail every audit. They require 50,000 gallons 
of water reserve, we don’t have this. Unless we have our own building and are willing to make 
this kind of investment [for social compliance], our main buyer will not continue with us…After 
Rana they [buyers] want us to be more socially compliant, but they are not willing to pay us for 
it…The trend will be that only the big players who can bear the cost of increased compliance 
requirements will survive and the smaller suppliers will shut down” This example shows that 
Supplier 1 was not able to survive in the industry because of its unwillingness to meet the greater 
social sustainability expectations of buyers, and this unwillingness was largely due to perceived 
conflict with its more dominant economic logic. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3:  Only those suppliers that are able to develop complementary economic and social 
logics will cultivate the capabilities that are necessary to respond to collective coercive pressure 
from buyers and improve their chances of long-term survival. 
 
5.2 Change in Mimetic Pressure and the Effect on Decoupling 
Our analysis of the case data before the collapse of Rana Plaza showed that one of the reasons 
for firm-related decoupling is mock compliance. This critical finding is connected to the larger 
literature stream on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of codes of conduct and, in particular, the 
audits that many customers require (Huq et al., 2014; Egels-Zandén and Lindholm, 2015). 
However, after the Rana Plaza disaster, suppliers were incentivized to reach minimum acceptable 
compliance standards. One of the reasons was amplified mimetic pressure through increased 
competition for orders as buyers backed away from procuring from less compliant suppliers, and 
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some buyers exited the Bangladesh market altogether. Thus, orders became harder to secure, and 
this made the risks of mock compliance too great for the reward. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Heightened mimetic pressure from an increase in competition for orders reduces 
the propensity of suppliers to decouple via mock compliance and leads to a higher level of social 
sustainability implementation.  
 
5.3 Change in Normative Pressure and the Effect on Decoupling 
After the Rana Plaza disaster, buyers (including via coalitions/horizontal collaboration) invested 
in the education and training of their own staff in Bangladesh and in that of their suppliers at all 
levels – owners, middle managers, and workers. For example, buyers used external consultants 
to train and develop supplier fire and building safety capabilities. Buyer 2’s Compliance 
Manager explained: “my firm flew me to the UK to attend training programmes on fire safety. 
We are now providing our suppliers with expert help”. Meanwhile, Supplier 3’s DMD described 
how buyer groups were educating and training his workers in stages. They first came with tablet 
computers and gave workers multiple choice questions to test their level of fire safety knowledge 
then shared the results with the management. He explained: “They asked the workers what they 
will do in case of a fire. Most answered that they would hide under the table! ... We were 
shocked as our HR department was ‘training’ them. We found that our training was not at all 
effective and it was not communicated well.” As a result, Supplier 3 sent around 20% of their 
workforce for fire safety training before becoming certified fire fighters. Through education and 
training, these workers became more aware of social compliance issues and were able to exert 
normative pressure on the suppliers. Buyer groups also tested and trained mid-level managers, 
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nurses, and electricians. But, according to the DMD of Supplier 3, the most important change 
was the education of the owners, which infused in them the need to have higher social standards. 
These measures decreased conflict between the social and economic logics in suppliers. This 
discussion leads to our next proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: Normative pressure via education and training from buyers causes a logic shift – 
heightening the social logic and reducing the dominance of the economic logic – thus lowering 
the propensity to decouple and leading to a higher level of social sustainability implementation. 
 
 Compliant factories, particularly proactive, early adopters that had built their competitive 
strategy around social sustainability now began to be rewarded. Indeed, once a supplier had 
invested in being socially responsible, it began to reap rewards through worker productivity and 
customer orders, which led to an enhanced reputation, attracting new customers, and so on. In 
particular, Supplier 7 had the most heightened social logic in our sample, winning numerous 
awards and paying its workers 20% above the industry average. Supplier 7 understood that the 
economic and social ideologies could complement each other in the long term and found 
improving standards actually increased productivity via worker retention and reduced 
absenteeism. Being socially sustainable was improving the company’s reputation and helping to 
attract more and better customers. In fact, the collapse of the Rana Plaza led to an influx of 
orders from like-minded buyers who not only offered better prices to compliant factories but also 
involved their suppliers in community projects, collaborating with various NGOs and donor 
agencies. This kind of stakeholder collaboration created extra normative pressure on such 




Proposition 6:  When the economic and social logics are perceived to be complementary, 
suppliers gain first-mover advantage to work with more socially sustainable buyers resulting in a 
virtuous cycle, whereby normative pressure continues to increase over time and thus reinforce 
social sustainability implementation.  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
With this study, we aimed to contribute to the emergent literature on the social aspects of ethical 
sourcing (Zorzini et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2016) through an empirical exploration of how the 
institutional pressures imposed on developing country suppliers affect the implementation of 
socially sustainable practices. So far, scholars have paid only limited attention to the supplier’s 
perspective, especially in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Yawar and Seuring, 2015; 
Zorzini et al., 2015). While we are not the first to have argued that the institutional context of a 
developing country means that actors experience different pressures to those in a developed 
country (Zhu and Sarkis, 2007; Sancha et al., 2015), to the best of our knowledge, ours is the 
first attempt to investigate the under-researched developing country supplier’s viewpoint in such 
detail. Our analysis illustrates subtle differences in the institutional pressures faced by 
developing country suppliers – for example, highlighting the mixed role played by NGOs, which 
have been viewed as entirely positive contributors to social performance in prior literature; the 
phenomenon of ‘enforced mimetic pressure’ whereby competition for workers also acts as an 
important source of mimetic pressure; a novel and emergent form of negative mimetic pressure 
exerted on proactive suppliers by unethical competitors to be less socially sustainable; and a new 
insight into normative pressure by highlighting the differences between the level of education 
and training of first and second-generation factory owners. 
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In a wider theoretical context, our analysis contributes to an enhanced understanding of the 
factors leading to the decoupling of ethical practices in challenging institutional contexts. One of 
our fundamental theoretical contributions is to have shown, through our set of propositions, how 
changes in various forms of institutional pressure can help to reduce developing country 
suppliers’ propensity to decouple, improving the level of implementation of socially sustainable 
practices. Thus, the work contributes to the broader theme of implementing ethical practices in 
challenging institutional settings and may be of particular interest to firms looking to bring about 
change and reform in distant suppliers that are spatially and culturally far removed. We now 
discuss in more detail how the key contributions of this study advance research on the social 
dimension of ethical sourcing. 
 Our study extends work on implementing ethical practices in developing country suppliers 
(Ehrgott et al., 2011; Huq et al., 2014) by illustrating the multi-level effects of institutional 
pressures on developing country suppliers to implement socially sustainable practices. A limited 
number of papers have recently explored social issues in supply chain management. For 
example, Huq et al. (2014) investigated buyer-supplier relationships through the Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) lens to understand the enablers and barriers of implementing social 
sustainability in developing country suppliers. The authors’ analysis provided insights into the 
type of supply chain governance mechanism required when transaction costs are high to bring 
about improvements in social sustainability. Further, it highlighted the need for buyers to extend 
their reach beyond first-tier suppliers by incorporating second and third-tier suppliers in the 
implementation process. Huq et al. (2014) also underlined the importance of Western buyers and 
developing country suppliers extending the scope of their activities to actively consider the roles 
of workers and other institutional actors, including trade unions, NGOs, and professional trade 
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bodies, in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the disconnect between the 
formal adoption of socially sustainable practices and actual implementation. 
 Institutional theory has provided us with a set of useful constructs for making sense of data 
from multiple (more than two) actors, whereas TCE mainly focuses on the direct and indirect 
costs of managing relationships between partners. Further, institutional theory has enabled us to 
understand how the forces that exist both within the buyer-supplier dyad and in the wider, 
external environment influence implementation. The main coercive pressure exerted on suppliers 
to implement socially sustainable practices was from buyers. Buyer pressure was similarly the 
most important driver of social reform in earlier studies (Yu, 2008; Marshall et al., 2016). The 
importance of this pressure varied depending on the attributes of the suppliers, who either 
proactively pursued new practices (Supplier 7) or reluctantly adopted required practices (e.g., 
Supplier 1). This finding corresponds to an earlier study by Sroufe et al. (2000) on adopting 
environmentally responsible manufacturing practices, which highlighted how firms influenced 
by costs found it difficult to bridge the gap (or chasm) to early adopters who were influenced 
predominantly by a corporate sustainability culture. Meanwhile, the mixed role played by NGOs 
– perceived by buyers as an important collaborative partner, but distrusted by suppliers – 
contrasts prior literature, which has offered unanimous support for their part in social 
sustainability implementation (Maignan et al., 2002; Walker and Jones, 2012). Further, our 
findings on the (limited) coercive role played by government go beyond the extant literature 
(Lim and Phillips, 2008; Yu, 2008; Lee and Kim, 2009) by highlighting how law enforcement 
can be undermined by alleged corruption and insufficient ‘policing’ resources. This leaves scope 
for opportunism and means buyers must continue to take on the main responsibility, thereby 
thrusting them into an increasingly politicized role.  
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In addition to coercive pressure, mimetic pressures were also felt by suppliers in our study. 
While other studies have highlighted that competition for orders leads to higher levels of 
implementing ethical practices (Yu, 2008; Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010), we also identified that 
competition for labor acts as an important source of mimetic pressure when there is a shortage of 
skilled workers. Further, we shed light on a unique form of negative mimetic pressure exerted on 
proactive suppliers by unethical competitors to be less socially sustainable, and also ‘enforced’ 
mimetic pressure exerted on suppliers by workers who demand better standards. Finally, it was 
found that normative pressure to comply largely builds through greater education and training of 
second-generation factory owners, with related knock-on effects, e.g., once a firm becomes more 
socially sustainable, the rewards can follow in terms of an enhanced reputation and new 
customers. This creates a virtuous cycle, steadily increasing the level of social sustainability 
implementation. 
Our focus on the decoupling phenomenon has identified firm, supply chain, and environment 
related factors that lead to a disconnect between the formal compliance structures apparently 
adopted by suppliers and the genuine implementation of socially sustainable practices. At the 
firm level, although many suppliers had successfully passed social audits, there was evidence of 
mock compliance. Previous studies have attributed this kind of behaviour to the inadequacies of 
social auditing (Barrientos and Smith, 2007), e.g., the failure of auditors to detect less visible 
issues such as freedom of association as compared to occupational safety (Anner, 2012). A 
similar concept has been put forward in relation to environmental sustainability – that of green 
washing (Walker et al., 2008). But unlike previous studies (Huq et al., 2014), we unpack the 
mock compliance phenomena into its component elements of hiding violations, short-term 
superficial conformance, and blatant cheating. We have also obtained further insights into the 
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firm-related factors that contribute to decoupling. For example, when the economic and social 
logics are perceived to be in conflict, the economic logic generally dominates and undermines 
implementation. Suppliers may be unwilling to make social improvements that increase costs, 
sometimes even when coerced into doing so, and they may actually prioritize economic 
performance to the detriment of social conditions. When these two logics are viewed as 
complementary, the implementation of socially sustainable practices appears much more likely 
to succeed. Sometimes, the supplier sees the complementarity of the logics after being coerced 
into implementation but more likely this is achieved through education and training. Thus, there 
is interplay between the institutional pressures and institutional logics.  
In a recent study, Carter et al. (2015) highlighted the opportunities available to develop and 
refine the dimensions of the supply chain, including its visible horizon, i.e., the part of the supply 
chain over which the focal firm has sufficient knowledge. In line with this, we provide insights 
into how not just traditional second-tier suppliers but also unauthorised sub-contractors are 
beyond the visible horizon of focal firms. This potential ‘dark side’ of the supply chain – 
characterised by poor visibility – can hamper implementation efforts. Therefore, when sourcing 
from developing countries, it is important to be aware of such supply chain-related decoupling 
factors. Our analysis has further shown that environment-related factors like a lack of law 
enforcement, due to the alleged widespread corruption of government inspectors, coupled with 
the government’s limited resources, also contribute to decoupling.  
 By studying such an extreme example of social sustainability implementation and failure, we 
claim to have been able to generate more transparent insights (Eisenhardt, 1989) while the 
richness of our longitudinal research has helped us provide details of how the core dynamics of 
the phenomenon played out over time (Siggelkow, 2007). As it is such a topical issue, the 
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collapse of the Rana Plaza has motivated various other studies relating to socially sustainable 
practices in the supply chain. For example, it has been studied empirically through primary case 
data by Huq et al. (2016) who explored the capabilities that buyers and suppliers can develop for 
social management (monitoring/auditing, collaboration, and innovation). But the authors did not 
examine in detail what motivates suppliers to adopt these capabilities or why they get detached 
from the ground reality. Meanwhile, Jacobs and Singhal (2017) used secondary data to conduct 
an event study on the effect of the Rana Plaza disaster on shareholder wealth and Plambeck and 
Taylor (2015) showed through modelling how a buyer might motivate a supplier to increase its 
responsibility efforts to avoid such a social failure. Our research expands this stream of research 
e.g., by illuminating how horizontal collaboration and collective action by groups of buyers 
intensifies coercive pressure on suppliers by increasing the consequences of non-compliance – 
and this serves to address decoupling.  
 
6.1 Implications for Practice 
When poor social standards are uncovered in the supply chain, they become intimately 
associated with a retailer’s products and brand. Social sustainability, therefore, becomes an 
important aspect of global supplier selection and development. Buyers looking to improve the 
social sustainability of their supply chains may need to use a combination of carrot and stick. 
Penalties for non-compliance, rigorous (unscheduled) audits, and collective action through 
collaborative groups of buyers have all been useful practices for improving implementation 
levels (stick). But, equally, it can be important to build mutually beneficial and trusting 
relationships with suppliers, to reward the most compliant factories, to share in the costs of 
implementation, and to demonstrate a long-term commitment to sourcing from a developing 
country (carrot).  
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 It is also important to anticipate any decoupling behavior by suppliers and consider how it can 
be detected and further restricted or avoided. This may involve revisiting codes of conduct and 
fostering a culture of openness, where the aim is that a supplier does not hide violations but 
rather works with a buyer to reach compliance. Global sourcing managers also need to be aware 
of the inefficient institutional environments of developing countries like Bangladesh and be 
equipped to contend with the lack of policing resources and regulatory enforcement. They must 
be prepared to invest in education and training – particularly that of middle managers and 
workers – if practices are to be successfully implemented. Education and training may help, for 
example, to overcome perceived conflict between the economic and social priorities rather than 
waiting for this to be triggered by another tragic industry event. 
Other institutional actors must also play their part in improving conditions and reducing the 
risk of further tragedies. For example, we have highlighted the need for NGOs and trade unions 
to build trust with suppliers, and for the industry’s trade body to take on a more prominent role in 
disseminating information and driving change. Government policy makers must also be 
encouraged to invest more resources in ensuring labor laws are enforced. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has focused entirely on institutional actors in Bangladesh. It could therefore be 
connected right through the global supply chain to retail headquarters and end-consumers in 
North America and Europe. The set of institutional actors studied in Bangladesh is also 
incomplete. In particular, the work could be extended to include tier-two suppliers, 
subcontractors, intermediaries, and third-party auditors. It would also be interesting to study how 
firm size affects homogeneity in terms of the implementation of socially sustainable practices in 
future research. We further argue that an insightful strand of future research could be to explore 
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how collective pressure from horizontal collaboration between buyers can be enabled. For 
example, non-traditional supply chain actors such as NGOs may play a significant role in 
building networks of collaborative partnerships between buyers, suppliers, NGOs, donor 
agencies, and trade bodies; and may bring together buyers that would normally compete with one 
another, putting aside their competitive agenda to collaboratively tackle an important industry-
wide problem. 
The Rana Plaza disaster was an incredibly tragic and unfortunate antecedent of improved 
sustainability in many Bangladeshi factories – it accelerated the implementation of socially 
sustainable practices. Given that cultural and socio-economic disparity with Western codes of 
conduct was one of the main decoupling factors, it is argued that there is now a need to develop a 
global compliance structure for Western brands that can be rolled out across all countries and 
industries. This would seek to ensure certain minimum social standards are upheld wherever 
sourcing takes place. It is particularly imperative given the phenomenon of sourcing migration 
across developing countries in search of lower labor costs. For example, Chinese firms are now 
effectively acting as sourcing agents for Western brands like Guess, Levi’s, and H&M, and 
turning countries like Ethiopia into the latest fast fashion ‘factory’ (Bloomberg, 2018). There is a 
significant risk that these new sourcing locations will fail to learn from history. It is therefore 
vital that changes mirroring those taking place in Bangladesh are achieved in these institutional 
contexts without being prompted by another tragedy.  
Finally, further motivation for implementation could be generated by quantifying the impact 
of social reform on overall economic performance. For example, this could be achieved via 
analytical modelling of buyers’ strategies to improve sustainability performance through 
horizontal collaboration. Case studies deliberately investigating discontinuation of social 
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certifications (e.g., SA8000, ISO 24000) could also be very valuable for understanding 
conditions that prompt organizations to abandon long-term sustainability goals. 
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 Level of Social Sustainability Implementation  
Criteria Low Medium High Key Literature 
General attitude 
towards, and scope of, 
compliance 
Compliance with local 
social sustainability laws 
only  
Compliance with local laws, 
plus buyers’ own codes of 
conduct or third party 
certifications 
Going above and beyond 
industry social standards and 
participation in supplier 
development programs 
(Ciliberti et al., 2009; Gugler 
and Shi, 2009; Marshall et al., 
2015) 
Depth of compliance 
behavior 
Symbolic compliance in 
regular circumstances 
Compliance in regular, stable 
conditions 
Complete compliance in all 
circumstances 






staff dealing with the 
implementation of socially 
sustainable practices  
Limited dedicated 
staff/departments dealing with 
the implementation of socially 
sustainable practices 
Dedicated staff/departments 
dealing with the implementation 
of socially sustainable practices 
(Gattiker and Carter, 2010; Huq 
et al., 2016) 
Education and 
awareness of social 
sustainability across 
the firm 
No training or education of 
staff on social issues 
Intermittent training or 
education of staff on social 
issues 
Periodic training and education 
of staff covering a wide range of 
social issues 




to social sustainability 
No cooperation with 
stakeholders to develop 
social sustainability 
compliance capabilities 
Evidence of limited 
collaboration with other 
stakeholders to develop social 
sustainability compliance 
capabilities 
Proactive collaboration with 
other stakeholders to develop 
social sustainability compliance 
capabilities 
(Mueller et al., 2009; Klassen 
and Vereecke, 2012; Eriksson 




No development of new 





Irregular development of new 




Leadership in implementing 
social sustainability initiatives 
by proactive and continuous 
development of new and more 
effective implementation 
tools/procedures/programs, etc. 
(Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; 
Huq et al., 2016). 





Company Size  Key Buyers/Suppliers Also Interviewed 
 No. of Interviews / FGDs 














Supplier 1 700 workers Buyer 6 
Managing Director (MD); Executive 
Director; Director; HR & Compliance 
Manager 
3 3 6 
Supplier 2 2,400 workers Buyer 2 & 6 HR Manager; Compliance Manager  2 0 2 
Supplier 3 1,500 workers Buyers 4 & 6 MD; Deputy MD (DMD); HR Manager  3 2 5 
Supplier 4 7,000 workers Buyer 1, 2 & 6 MD; COO; Compliance Manager  3 0 3 
Supplier 5 1,400 workers Buyer 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 Chairman; CEO; HR & Compliance Manager 3 0 3 
Supplier 6 3,000 workers Buyer 5 Chairman; Director; HR Manager 3 1 4 




















Buyer 1 (European) >$10 billion Suppliers 4, 5 & 10  Country Manager; Supply Chain Manager; Compliance Executive  3 0 3 
Buyer 2 (European) $5-10 billion Suppliers 3, 4 & 5 Head of Compliance 1 1 2 
Buyer 3 (North American) $3-5  billion  Supplier 5  Country Manager 1 1 2 
Buyer 4 (European) >$20  billion Suppliers 2, 6, 5 Logistics Manager;  Sustainability Manager 2 0 2 
Buyer 5  (European) >$20  billion  Supplier 7 CSR Manager 1 0 1 
Buyer 6 (North American) >$20  billion  Suppliers 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 Sourcing Manager 1 1 2 
  
International Chamber of Commerce Unknown  N/A President 1 0 1 
Local Chamber of Commerce 426 member bodies  N/A Director 1 0 1 
Apparel Trade Body 5,150 member factories  N/A Vice President; Deputy Secretary 2 2 4 
Trade Union 1 80,000 members  N/A President; General Secretary 2 2 4 
Trade Union 2 11,000 members  N/A President; General Secretary; Organisational Secretary 3 0 3 
Local Non-Government Organisation 
(NGO1)   N/A  N/A 
Chairwoman; General Secretary; 
Operations Director 3 2 5 
International Non-Government 
Organisation (NGO2)  N/A  N/A Manager 0 1 1 
Worker Focus Group Discussion 1 
(FGD1)  N/A  N/A 12 workers 1 0 1 
Worker Focus Group Discussion 2 
(FGD2)  N/A N/A  9 workers 1 0 1 
 




  Level of Social Sustainability Implementation  
 
 Low Moderate High 
 





















Buyers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 
Professional Trade 
bodies/associations Y Y Y N N Y N 4 
Government Y N N N N Y N 2 
Trade 
Unions/Workers N N N N N N N 0 















Management N N Y Y Y Y Y 5 
Workers N N N N N N Y 1 
Professional Trade 
Bodies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 
 












Institutional Pressure on 
Developing Country Suppliers 
Effectiveness of  Pressure 
on Implementation Illustrative Quotations 
Coercive Pressures 
Buyers High 
I think it was forced by the buyers or else social compliance wouldn’t have happened. Proactive social 
responsibility [by suppliers] is very negligible. (Supplier 1, Compliance Manager) 
 
It is because of the buyer pressure. If you are not compliant, the buyers won’t give you work. Social 
compliance is being enforced only because of the buyer. (Supplier 6, HR Manager) 
Professional Trade bodies/ 
associations Medium 
The Apparel Trade Body has monitoring teams who inspect the factories for compliance, such as on child 
labour. They are very serious about it or else the industry as a whole will be plagued worldwide. The 
motivation or initiative is from us as all owners are members. They have taken action against faulty 
factories, such as fines or they lose their membership. (Supplier 1, MD) 
Government Low 
If it is left to the government to implement social standards, it will never happen. (Supplier 5, HR 
Manager) 
 
The labor laws are there but not strictly implemented and you could circumvent them. (Supplier 1, MD) 
Trade Unions/Workers Low 
…the law and order situation in Bangladesh is not conducive to trade unions. (Supplier 2, Compliance 
Manager) 
 
Within the factory, there are still no trade unions. (Supplier 6, Director) 
NGOs/Rights groups Low 
I feel the NGOs play a very negative role for this industry. They have a hidden agenda and give an image 
that they care about the workers…they are always vindictive towards the factories…make no mistake that 
a certain proportion of them are exploiting the workers. (Supplier 3, DMD) 
Mimetic Pressures   
Competitors (and Competition 
for Orders) High 
Since there are a lot of factories now and lot more competition, everyone is under pressure to improve 
[social standards] to attract buyers. (Supplier 6, Director) 
 
Another factor is that now there is more competition amongst the factories. If we are not compliant then 
the buyer will give the order to someone who is. (Supplier 4, Compliance Manager) 
  
 
Workers (and Competition for 
Workers) Medium 
The market has changed tremendously in the last five years. Five years ago, there was an abundance of 
garment workers, but now there has been a massive increase in the number of factories. The social 
compliance issues are not something only from the buyers’ side now. It is also a competitive pressure as 
other factories are doing them. If a factory now does not pay the workers a proper salary or give them the 
benefits that they are entitled to, then it will not get any workers as the demand for workers far exceeds the 
supply. (Supplier 3, DMD) 
Normative Pressures   
Owners/Mid-Management Medium 
The owner’s educational background, international exposure and willingness plays a part. (Supplier 7, HR 
Manager) 
 
It was the initiative of our Chairman. He has a Masters in commerce. He is very open and very concerned 
about sustainability. (Supplier 7, Head of Sustainability) 
 
At the manager level, we have a three-day orientation program in which there are 2 sessions that are on 
sustainability.  (Supplier 7, Distribution Executive) 
Workers Low 
Internally we give training to the workers. We have a separate training department who does this. Every 
worker goes through an orientation program when they join where we train them about their rights. We 
also train our HR personnel called ToT [Training of Trainers] so that they can train the workers. At the 
moment, we have 39 types of training that is provided to our employees. (Supplier 7, Head of 
Sustainability) 
 
Five years ago, the workers didn’t even know what is basic salary or overtime. Now they know everything. 
(Supplier 3, DMD) 
Professional Trade 
Bodies/Associations Medium 
Initially, [the Apparel Trade Body] had consultants who helped me understand compliance. From time to 
time, they arrange training for us. (Supplier 3, HR Manager) 
 
The [Apparel Trade Body] gives training sessions. I have attended some of them. But this is in 
collaboration with the buyers. We were given some materials and posters, which we have shared in our 
factory to build awareness. (Supplier 6 HR Manager) 
 












  Level of Social Sustainability Implementation  
 



















Conflict in economic and 
social logics Y Y Y Y Y Y N 6 
Preparedness to mock 
comply by suppliers Y Y Y Y N Y N 5 
Supply chain 
related 
Overlooking of violations 
by buyers Y Y Y Y N Y N 5 
Adversarial relationships 
with auditors Y Y Y Y N Y N 5 
Lack of supply chain 




economic disparity with 
Western codes of conduct 
Y Y Y Y N Y N 5 
Lack of government 
enforcement of the law Y Y Y N Y Y N 5 
 
















 Illustration of Triangulation for Decoupling Factors 
Decoupling Factor Suppliers Buyers Other Institutional Actors 
Conflict in economic and social 
logics 
 
Institutional logics are values, 
beliefs, and rules that provide a 
means of understanding the social 
world and prescribe guidelines on 
how to function in it in order to 
gain legitimacy from institutional 
actors. 
 
The economic logic concerns the 
desire to maximise profits; and the 
social logic concerns the need to 
have high social standards. 
The main issue is the price from the buyer. 
If the buyer helps in terms of price then the 
owners will be more encouraging towards 
the compliance department and give us even 
more facilities to ensure social compliance. 
(Supplier 1, HR & Compliance Manager) 
 
The buyers want us to implement social 
sustainability but the main problem is price. 
They are right in their goal, but they are not 
right in their approach. They have to 
understand that this is a developing country. 
If they want to implement social 
sustainability, it involves cost.  
(Supplier 5,CEO) 
If, by giving work to a highly 
compliant factory, the price 
increases from $3 per unit to $3.5 
per unit, then as a buyer we cannot 
accept that. (Buyer 6, Sourcing 
Manager)  
The buyers are not helping the suppliers at 
all by sharing the costs of implementing 
social compliance and that is the crux of the 
problem. They have been pushing prices 
downwards and if you are more compliant it 
is unlikely that the buyers will pay you 
more…If the buyers give us an extra $5 per 
garment, we will invest an entire 50c on 
compliance. But the buyers are not willing to 
do this… (Local Chamber, Director) 
 
When we ask the suppliers to improve social 
standards, they complain to us about the 
decreasing prices that they are being offered 
by the buyers. They are having increased 
costs in terms of infrastructure development 
and increased wages. We try to highlight 
these things to the buyers, media and in 




Preparedness to mock comply by 
suppliers 
 
A preparedness and cultural 
acceptance within the suppliers 
towards mock compliance. Mock 
compliance is where a supplier 
appears to be complying with a 
code of conduct but is in fact 
concealing non-compliance 
Buyer XYZ [a major multinational retailer] 
only allows 8-hour shifts with 2 hours 
overtime per day. But it is not possible to 
conform to this standard in the peak season 
and workers want more overtime as they get 
double the basic rate. If we only gave the 
workers 48 hours of overtime per month, 
they would leave and go elsewhere. 
(Supplier 3, DMD) 
 
We are working on Fridays though it is a 
weekly holiday according to the country 
law. Since we cannot show this to the 
buyers, we have to keep two sets of 




The suppliers are falsifying 
documents. (Buyer 2, Head of 
Compliance) 
Before the audit, everything is made ‘tip-
top’. When the buyer comes for audit, they 
[the supplier factory owners] phone us and 
ask us to bring our children in [to the child 
care centre]. We have to comply as we don’t 
want to lose our job. (FGD2, Workers) 
 
They announce over the microphone that the 
auditors will come today, and then they 
provide us with the safety 
equipment/accessories. Even though we 
should be provided with these always, they 
just give them to us during the audit days 
and after it is done they take them away. 
(FGD 1, Workers) 
Overlooking of violations by 
buyers 
 
This includes where a buyer is 
simply interested in maintaining 
their image and not necessarily in 
genuinely improving suppliers’ 
social standards. 
Some buyers don’t allow the factory to be 
open on Fridays, which is a public holiday. 
But the auditors who are living in this 
country know that most of the factories are 
open on Fridays, but they don’t say 
anything. They turn a blind eye and give 
excuses like a lack of evidence. (Supplier 1, 
Compliance Manager) 
It is a well-known fact that the 
suppliers will run the factory more 
than the buyer stipulated hours 
allow as they need to do it to meet 
delivery targets. Some buyers over-
look these violations by saying that 
as long as you provide me with 
documentary evidence [that you 
comply] I don’t care. (Buyer 5, 
CSR Manager) 
Some of the auditors try to overlook 
violations. There are instances of corruption 
by auditors. (President, Trade Union 2) 
Adversarial relationship with 
auditors 
 
Where the two parties (suppliers 
and auditors) treat each other as 
enemies instead of as partners, little 
or no trust between and formal 
means of communication. 
It [relationship with buyer's auditors] is 
mainly confrontational. Usually they are 
very aggressive and they want to find faults, 
while we try hiding stuff from them. 
(Supplier 1, Compliance Manager) 
I agree that the attitude of the 
auditors is a policing attitude. But 
for that he factory is also 
responsible as they try to hide stuff.  
(Buyer 2, Compliance Manager) 
The buyers implement socially sustainable 
practices mainly through their audits. But 
most of these audits are announced and there 
is a lot of hide-and-seek going on. 
(President, Trade Union 2) 
  
 
Lack of supply chain visibility 
 
Refers to the hidden or dark side of 
the supply chain, i.e. the part of the 
supply chain of which the focal 
agent has insufficient knowledge.  
There are some large suppliers who might 
have 10 factories out of which only 2 are 
fully compliant. When the buyers come for 
audit, they take them to these [compliant] 
factories, but spread the work over the other 
8 non-compliant factories. (Supplier 7, 
Director) 
 
We subcontract to other factories, but we 
don’t ensure their compliance. We deal with 
a buying agent and not the direct buyer. The 
buying agent knows about this, but the 
auditor and main buyer does not. (Supplier 
1, Compliance Manager) 
The suppliers are taking on more 
orders than their capacity and then 
subcontracting the work to less 
compliant factories. We had a 
supplier who subcontracted to a 
sweatshop without telling us. This 
was exposed in the mainstream 
international media. (Buyer 5, CSR 
Manager) 
There are 400 to 500 suppliers in the 
industry who are fully compliant…They are 
the ones who are mainly getting orders. But 
the key problem is that they are 
subcontracting this work out to other non-
compliant factories. (Foreign Chamber of 
Commerce, President) 
 
There are many discrepancies in the buying 
agents’ [intermediaries] monitoring of social 
compliance standards. (Local Chamber of 
Commerce, Director) 
Cultural and socio-economic 
disparity with Western codes of 
conduct 
 
Differences in beliefs, customs, 
practices and economic situation 
between multi-national buyers and 
their developing country suppliers 
Some of the conditions that buyers force on 
us through their codes are not culturally 
compatible. In our country, when the mother 
comes to work she will not bring her child 
with her, rather she will prefer leaving the 
child with her relatives. So this big room in 
the factory is not being utilized and the 
space is wasted. (Supplier 1, Managing 
Director). 
 
Foreigners might bring their children to 
work, but our culture is different. But we 
have to create this [child care room] and 
incur the cost just because the buyers are not 
willing to understand the reality of our 
country. This is a total waste. The mother 
feels comfortable leaving the child at home. 
Our society is like that and the auditors 
should account for the sensitivities of the 
local culture. It is a very important issue. 
(Supplier 2, HR Manager) 
The social norms in Bangladesh are 
different from Western norms. If 
we try to impose one on the other, it 
will not work. It is a very complex 
issue. (Buyer 5, CSR Manager) 
 
The child labor issue is a very 
delicate issue and I have grappled 
with it for a long time. To this day, 
I don’t have a real answer. If you 
allow the children to work today, 
their children will also end up 
working. So, you need to build a 
society where this has to stop 
somewhere. (Buyer 3, Country 
Manager) 
There is a law that younger children will do 
less heavy work. But no factory will employ 
labour like this. But if they did do this, these 
children would not be left helpless (Workers, 
FGD 2). 
 
I don’t think that if you have the proper 
infrastructure to take care of the children the 
women workers will be reluctant to bring in 
their children to the day care centre. I have 
seen day care centres in factories situated 
besides rooms in which harmful chemicals 
are stored. In such an environment, even a 
very poor mother will not keep her child. 
(Trade Union 1, President) 
  
 
Lack of government enforcement 
of the law 
 
Poor regulation due to 
bureaucracy, corruption or lack of 
resources and infrastructure. 
The government labor agency comes to 
audit every 6 months, but mainly they come 
for money. They see violations, but if you 
bribe them, they go away. (Supplier 1, 
Compliance Manager) 
 
The government have made the labour laws, 
but they don’t enforce them.  We need 18 
licenses to operate a factory. The 
government has an inspector who comes one 
day in the year, takes bribes from the 
management, ticks boxes and leaves. It’s a 
small amount. (Supplier 6, HR Manager) 
A team of government inspectors 
conduct around 15 audits in a day - 
you cannot spend more than an 
hour in one facility. So you can 
imagine what the quality of that 
audit will be like. (Buyer 7, 
Corporate Sustainability Manager) 
The Chief Inspector of Factories is 
responsible for implementing the labor law, 
but all over Bangladesh he has only 44 
inspectors. (Trade Union 2, President) 
 











Figure 1: Decoupling Factors in the Context of Socially Sustainable Practices  
 
